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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ESTATE TAx-TRANSFER TAX-SITUS OF INTANGIBLES FOR
TAXATION OF NON-RESIDENT'S PROPERTY.-Bonds, promissory notes
and credits were deposited by a resident of Illinois in a Missouri
bank. The notes were secured by liens upon land situated in Mis-
souri. On her death, Illinois imposed an inheritance tax on the value
of all the intangible property, wherever situated. Missouri thereafter
taxed the transfer of the non-resident's property and was upheld by
its Supreme Court. On appeal, Held, reversed. Though the property
was physically in Missouri the tax situs was in the owner's state,
Illinois, and, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Missouri could not
tax the transfer to the decedent's son. Holmes, Stone, Brandeis,
dissent. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U3. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1930).
Earlier in the same term it was held the corpus of a trust could
be taxed only at the domicile of the trustee when the beneficiaries
had no control.1 It was also decided that Minnesota could not levy a
tax on bonds of that State which physically were in New York, the
domicile of the owner. 2 The present attitude of the Court indicates
the application of the maxim mobilia sequentur personana, when the
situs of the debt is found at the owner's domicile. But fundamen-
tally, the Supreme Court seems desirous of eliminating the burdens
of double taxation.3 For a long time it had been the rule that both
States, the one of the situs of property and the State of the owner's
domicile could levy a tax.4 The Court in the instant case was forced
to overlook a long line of its own decisions to reach the majority
ruling and a strong minority opinion by Stone, J., favors the imposi-
tion of a double tax as long as the owner has secured the benefit and
protection of the two States. The majority view circumvents the
possible evasion of taxation and reaches a result sought by the recip-
rocal exemption statutes carried on the statute books of over three-
fourths of the states. Holmes, J., in the dissent, favors the result
reached by the decision in allowing only one state to tax intangibles
but is fearful of the abrogation of the constitutional rights of the
1 Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59
(1929).
' Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98
(1930); see (1930) 4 St. John's L. Rev. 322.
McReynolds, J., p. 438, "the inference seems to be that double taxation-
by two states on the same transfer-should be sustained in order to prevent
escape from liability in exceptional cases. We cannot assent."
4Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189. 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903) ; Liverpool,
London and Globe Ins. Co. v. Orleans Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct.
416 (1911); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 34 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925);
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1927).
Stone, J., dissenting. 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 439 (1930).
TAX COMMENT
states.6 From a practical, economic viewpoint the decision seems
sound. It is unfortunate that the decision does not settle the mooted
point concerning the double taxability of stock and like intangibles.
W. H. S.
ESTATE TAX-VALIDITY OF A LEVY ON LIFE INSURANCE POLI-
CIES ISSUED BEFORE PASSAGE OF ESTATE TAX WHERE RIGHT TO
CHANGE BENEFICIARY WAS RESERVED.-Decedent, who died in 1920,
procured four insurance policies; two of them were issued before
the effective date of the Act. In each, he named his wife as the
beneficiary and reserved the power to change the beneficiary. Against
the protest of his executors a transfer tax was paid on these two
policies. An action was brought to recover this amount by the plain-
tiff as executor. On appeal, Held, that a levy on life insurance
policies issued before the passage of the Estate Tax Law was valid
where a power to change beneficiary was retained under section
402 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1918.* Heiner v. Grandin, Circuit
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit (1930).
The Supreme Court has held that a tax may not be imposed on
insurance policies issued before the Estate Tax Law was enacted
where the right to change the beneficiary was not reserved.' Where
the policies were procured subsequently to the passage of the Act,
and the right to change was reserved the validity of a tax levy was
upheld.2 As to what the rule would be in a case where the right to
change had been retained on policies issued before the Act, we have,
as yet, no statement. from the Supreme Court. In a recent case 3
involving trusts created under conditions very similar to the instant
case, the trusts were held to be taxable, since it was a transfer
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the
grantor's death, and thus part of his estate. The right to the enjoy-
ment and possession was generated by decedent's death precisely the
same as the right to possession and enjoyment of a trust estate
'Holmes, J., dissenting, says at p. 439, "I have not yet adequately expressed
the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever-increasing scope given to the
Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional
rights of the state."
*The statute reads: "* * * that the value of the gross estate of the
decedent shall be determined by including at the time of his death of all prop-
erty, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated,
(f) To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance
under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent
of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries
as insurance under policies taken out by decedent upon his own life."1Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238, 45 Sup. Ct. 487 (1925).2 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126
(1929).
SReinecke v. Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123 (1929).
